Minutas FOMC

Abaixo, fiz uma breve compilação de trechos das Minutas do FOMC  que julgo serem importantes para o debate de política monetária no país. Acredito que as Minutas foram mais dovish vis-à-vis os últimos comentários de membros do Fed. Além disso, desde a último reunião, tivemos novas evidencias de acomodação do crescimento, assim como novos sinais de que a inflação ficará mais baixa por tempo ainda mais prolongado do que o imaginado. A divulgação do Core PPI hoje apenas confirmou este cenário.

Acredito que a probabilidade de alta de juros em junho tenha se reduzido após as Minutas e aos últimos números de atividade e inflação no país. Contudo, o Comitê permanecerá “data dependente”, ou seja, caso a acomodação do crescimento e da inflação se mostrem pontuais, ainda existe a disposição por parte do FOMC em começar um processo de ajuste de juros o quanto antes.

As Minutas deveriam dar ímpeto ao movimento de acomodação/consolidação do USD ao redor do mundo. Além disso, podemos ter uma pausa no movimento de abertura de taxas de juros nos EUA, o que deveria ser visto como positivo para os ativos emergentes. Caso a leitura do mercado seja nesta direção, os mercados locais (Brasil) de cambio e renda fixa poderiam se favorecer de um ambiente externo onde os juros americano permanecerá baixo por um tempo ainda mais prolongado do que o imaginado nos últimos dias. Vale lembrar que a Treasury 10 anos abriu de 1.63% para 2.15% ao longo deste mês, se mostrando um “vento contrário” forte ao desempenho dos ativos emergentes nas últimas semanas.

O trecho que julgo ser o mais explicativo do pensamento reinante no FOMC, cujo o vies acredito ter sido dovish: A number of participants suggested that they would need to see further improvement in labor market conditions and data pointing to continued growth in real activity at a pace sufficient to support additional labor market gains before beginning policy normalization. Many participants indicated that such economic conditions would help bolster their confidence in the likelihood of inflation moving toward the Committee's 2 percent objective after the transitory effects of lower energy prices and other factors dissipate. Some participants noted that their confidence in inflation returning to 2 percent would also be bolstered by stable or rising levels of core PCE inflation, or of alternative series, such as trimmed mean or median measures of inflation. A number of participants emphasized that they would need to see either an increase in market-based measures of inflation compensation or evidence that continued low readings on these measures did not constitute grounds for concern. Several participants indicated that signs of improvements in labor compensation would be an important signal, while a few others deemphasized the value of labor compensation data for judging incipient inflation pressures in light of the loose short-run empirical connection between wage and price inflation.

Externo e USD:  However, the increase in the foreign exchange value of the dollar was expected to be a persistent source of restraint on U.S. net exports, and a few participants pointed to the risk that the dollar could appreciate further. In addition, the slowdown of growth in China was noted as a factor restraining economic expansion in a number of countries, and several continuing risks to the international economic outlook were cited, including global disinflationary pressure, tensions in the Middle East and Ukraine, and financial uncertainty in Greece. Overall, the risks to the outlook for U.S. economic activity and the labor market were seen as nearly balanced.

Inflação: Participants noted that inflation had moved further below the Committee's longer-run objective, largely reflecting declines in energy prices and other transitory factors. A number of participants observed that, with anchored inflation expectations, the fall in energy prices should not leave an enduring imprint on aggregate inflation. It was pointed out that the recent intensification of downward pressure on inflation reflected price movements that were concentrated in a narrow range of items in households' consumption basket, a pattern borne out by trimmed mean measures of inflation. Several participants remarked that inflation measures that excluded energy items had also moved down in recent months, but these declines partly reflected transitory factors, including downward pressure on import prices and the pass-through of lower energy costs to the prices of non- energy items. Nonetheless, several participants saw the continuing weakness of core inflation measures as a concern. In addition, a few participants suggested that the weakness of nominal wage growth indicated that core and headline inflation could take longer to return to 2 percent than the Committee anticipated. In contrast, a couple of participants suggested that nominal wage growth provides little information about the future behavior of price inflation. Participants also discussed the possibility that, because of the infrequent occurrence of reductions in nominal wages, wages may not have fully adjusted downward in the period of high unemployment, and therefore pent-up wage deflation might have weighed on wage gains for a time during the expansion. If this was the case, nominal wage growth could be expected to pick up in coming periods and to resume a more normal relationship with labor market slack. Most participants expected that continuing reductions in resource slack would be helpful in returning inflation over the medium term to the Committee's 2 percent longer-run objective, but a few participants voiced concern that nominal wage growth might rise rapidly and inflation might exceed 2 percent for a time.

Participants discussed the sizable decline in market-based measures of inflation compensation that had been observed over the past year and continued over the intermeeting period. A number of them judged that the decline mostly reflected a reduction in the risk premiums embedded in nominal interest rates rather than a decline in inflation expectations; this interpretation was supported by results of some analytical models used to decompose movements in market-based measures of inflation compensation and also by the continuing stability of survey-based measures of inflation expectations. However, other participants put some weight on the possibility that the decline in inflation compensation reflected a reduction in expected inflation. These participants further argued that the stability of survey-based measures of inflation expectations should not be taken as providing much reassurance; in particular, it was noted that in Japan in the late 1990s and early 2000s, survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations had not recorded major declines even as a disinflationary process had become entrenched. In addition, a few participants argued that even if the shift down in inflation compensation reflected lower inflation risk premiums rather than reductions in expected inflation, policymakers might still want to take that decline into account because it could reflect increased concern on the part of investors about adverse outcomes in which low inflation was accompanied by weak economic activity. Participants generally agreed that the behavior of market-based measures of inflation compensation needed to be monitored closely.

Juros: Many participants indicated that their assessment of the balance of risks associated with the timing of the beginning of policy normalization had inclined them toward keeping the federal funds rate at its effective lower bound for a longer time. Some observed that, even with these risks taken into consideration, the federal funds rate may have already been kept at its lower bound for a sufficient length of time, and that it might be appropriate to begin policy firming in the near term. Regardless of the particular strategy undertaken, it was noted that, provided that the data-dependent nature of the path for the federal funds rate after its initial increase could be communicated to financial markets and the general public in an effective manner, the precise date at which firming commenced would have a less important bearing on economic outcomes.

Participants discussed the economic conditions that they anticipate will prevail at the time they expect it will be appropriate to begin normalizing policy. There was wide agreement that it would be difficult to specify in advance an exhaustive list of economic indicators and the values that these indicators would need to take. Nonetheless, a number of participants suggested that they would need to see further improvement in labor market conditions and data pointing to continued growth in real activity at a pace sufficient to support additional labor market gains before beginning policy normalization. Many participants indicated that such economic conditions would help bolster their confidence in the likelihood of inflation moving toward the Committee's 2 percent objective after the transitory effects of lower energy prices and other factors dissipate. Some participants noted that their confidence in inflation returning to 2 percent would also be bolstered by stable or rising levels of core PCE inflation, or of alternative series, such as trimmed mean or median measures of inflation. A number of participants emphasized that they would need to see either an increase in market-based measures of inflation compensation or evidence that continued low readings on these measures did not constitute grounds for concern. Several participants indicated that signs of improvements in labor compensation would be an important signal, while a few others deemphasized the value of labor compensation data for judging incipient inflation pressures in light of the loose short-run empirical connection between wage and price inflation.