Fed e Rússia

Acho válido fazermos uma breve comparação do cenário atual com aquele verificado em agosto/setembro de 1998, quando eclodiu a primeira crise da Rússia. Naquele momento, os juros nos EUA eram de 5.50%. O Fed decidiu por reduzir as taxas em 25bps, e acabou fazendo um ciclo total de 75bps de queda de juros nos meses subsequentes. Fazendo uma breve leitura das Minutas daquela reunião do FOMC do setembro de 1998 (vide abaixo), observamos um cenário muito parecido com o atual. Uma diferença relevante é que, naquele momento, o Fed tinha “munição” para utilizar, leia-se, baixar os juros. Hoje, a crise na Rússia parece menor, e muito mais contida do que em 1998 (pelo menos por enquanto). Contudo, a “munição” do Fed é muito menor já que os juros já estão a zero e o QE vem perdendo potencia a algum tempo.

Em suma, dado os últimos desenvolvimentos ao redor do mundo, o Fed pode se dar ao luxo de manter as condições monetárias expansionistas e, inclusive, manter o “considerable time” no comunicado.

 Fed Statement Sept 1998:

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to ease the stance of monetary policy slightly, expecting the federal funds rate to decline 1/4 percentage point to around 5-1/4 percent. The action was taken to cushion the effects on prospective economic growth in the United States of increasing weakness in foreign economies and of less accommodative financial conditions domestically. The recent changes in the global economy and adjustments in U.S. financial markets mean that a slightly lower federal funds rate should now be consistent with keeping inflation low and sustaining economic growth going forward. The discount rate remains unchanged at 5 percent.

Fed Minutes Sept 1998:

In the Committee's discussion of current and prospective economic conditions, members focused on developments that pointed to the potential for a significant weakening in the growth of spending. They recognized that there were at present few statistical indications that the economy was on a significantly slower growth track. Indeed, the available data suggested that consumer expenditures and business investment retained considerable strength. At the same time, however, investors' perceptions of risks and their aversion to taking on more risk had increased markedly in financial markets around the world. That change in sentiment was exacerbating financial and economic problems in a number of important trading partners of the United States. In addition, it was generating lower equity prices and tightening credit availability in U.S. financial markets. As a consequence, the downside risks to the domestic expansion appeared to have risen substantially in recent weeks. Though labor markets were expected to remain relatively tight for some time, the members saw little prospect that inflation would gather significant momentum in coming quarters. Declining commodity and other import prices would be restraining prices and inflation expectations for a while. Overall consumer prices might rise a little more rapidly next year as the effects of a number of favorable factors, such as falling energy prices, diminished or reversed, but underlying inflation was expected to stay quite subdued as inflation expectations remained damped and pressures in labor markets became less pronounced.

The intensification and further spread of turmoil in international financial markets, notably since the outbreak of a financial crisis in Russia in mid-August, had spilled over into U.S. financial markets. Strong demands for safety and liquidity had driven down yields on U.S. Treasury securities, but spreads of private rates over Treasury rates had gapped higher. Increases in risk spreads were especially large for lower-grade borrowers and on bonds below investment grade, whose rates had increased considerably since mid-August. In addition, many banks had tightened their credit standards and terms. Prices in U.S. equity markets, which had weakened appreciably before the crisis in Russia, had declined substantially further. These market developments strongly suggested, and anecdotal reports tended to confirm, the emergence of widespread perceptions of greater risks in a broad range of financial investment activities and of considerably greater reluctance to put capital at risk. The members did not believe that the tightness in credit markets and strong demand for safety and liquidity were likely to lead to a "credit crunch," though some members expressed the view that such an outcome could not be ruled out. At a time when business balance sheets already indicated a significant softening of cash flows owing to weaker profits, many business firms were experiencing increased difficulty and costs in their efforts to raise funds in debt or equity markets or to borrow from lending institutions; if these conditions were to persist, the sustainability of the current strength in business capital expenditures would come into question. The decline in stock market prices also appeared likely to damp the growth of consumer spending over time, with added implications for business capital expenditures.

Despite the emergence of decidedly less hospitable financial conditions, there were few indications in the data available to the Committee of any weakening as yet in consumer and business spending. Consumer expenditures, though temporarily held back by shortages of new motor vehicles stemming from the work stoppage at General Motors, had remained on a solid uptrend, with overall growth in recent months apparently slipping only a little from a remarkably rapid pace in the first half of the year. Strong growth in jobs and incomes along with substantial further increases in stock market prices through mid-July had fostered a high level of consumer confidence and spending. Members commented that the more recent weakness in the stock market and the related decline in household net worth had removed an important support for the growth of consumer spending, but they noted that recent surveys indicated only a slight deterioration in consumer sentiment and that the stimulus from earlier stock market gains probably would dissipate only gradually. Looking further ahead, consumer spending could be expected to expand at a pace that was more in line with the growth of household incomes than it had been in recent years.